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F 0 R R E L E A S E 
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
at t he 
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE CONVOCATION 
MEMORIAL GYMNASIUM 
Sunday, February 11, 1968 
8:00 p.m. , e. s. t. 
VIET NAM 
My remarks, today, deal with Viet Nam. Before 
proceeding to them, however, I wish to refer to the USS Pueblo 
incident. When added to the Vietnamese conflict, it is illustra-
tive of the hydra-headed character of military involvement on 
the mainland of Asia. War spreads readily on that continent; 
the difficulty lies in curbing it. I would emphasize, therefore, 
that while the urgency in Viet Nam is to bring one bloody conflict 
to a close, the imperative in Korea is to prevent the opening 
of another. 
In the latter connection, it will help to bear in 
mind the essent i als of the Pueblo affair. A U. S. vessel--that 
it was an electronic listener of some sort is not disputed--was 
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in a position off the North Korean coast. What vital national 
need prompted the dispatch of this particular mission or why the 
vessel went undefended are not known. 
All reports available to me indicate that the 
Pueblo was in international waters at the time it was taken. 
As of the moment, the Pueblo is now at anchor in Wonsan harbor 
and the 82 surviving crewmen who were aboard--one other has 
died--are interned in North Korea. That ineluctable fact is 
in no way altered by a sense of outrage or indignation. 
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying out a 
dangerous assignment. The "why" and the ''how" of the mission 
are moot at thts point. What matters now is the obligation to 
those men. In our reactions to the Pueblo affair, lives must 
not become the pawns of either pride or petulance . Every effort 
to bring about their release must be made. 
We will also do well to bear in mind that the one 
war in which we are engaged on the Asian mainland has become a 
source of immense grief . Any move which leads into a second 
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Vietnamese-type conflict in Korea will compound the grief but 
hardly serve the interests of this nation. 
In sum, what most matters at this point, it seems 
to me, is: (1) return of the 80-odd American crewmen· alive--
I repeat, alive--and; (2) prevention of a second war in Korea 
on the pattern of Viet Nam which could the more readily become 
World War III. 
The firm restraint which President Johnson has 
exercised from the outset of the Pueblo affair has set a wise 
course for this nation. The question has been raised at the 
United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. 
It has been pursued at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions 
between our representatives and those of North Xorea . ·· Other 
channels are also being tapped which might lead to the release 
of the crewmen. In short, the President's policy at this time 
is to seek a solution by diplomacy. It is the course of prudence 
and reason in what is, at best, a delicate and aangerous situa~ 
tion. It deserves every support of the nation. 
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There is no certainty that the present efforts 
will bear fruit. Other possibilities, however, may also be 
available. I would point out, for example, that, if necessary, 
the matter should be pressed further at the United Nations which 
has had a definite responsibility in Korea for almost two decades 
If it comes to that, it may be feasible to seek impartial arbi-
tration or mediation or a presentation of the entire matter to 
the World Court. May I say that precedent for the latter proce-
dure is to be found in a similar dispute two decades ago over 
the loss of two Bri tish destroyers off the Albanian Coast. 
Whatever the specific recourse, in my judgment, 
the efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Pueblo affair 
are attuned to this nation's i nterest. What matters in my 
judgment i s saving lives, not savi ng face. What matters is 
the substance not the shadow of this nation's i nterests. 
That is true in Korea; and it is no less true in 
VietNam. The nation's interests in VietNam, in my judgment, 
lie in bringing the war to an honorable conclusion at the 
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earliest possible moment. The pursujt of a negotiated solution 
was right for this nation before the recent coordinated offen-
sives in the South Vietnamese cities. It is right today, while 
that offensive continues in certain areas and when a second 
offensive may be on the verge of opening, if not in Khe Sanh, 
somewhere else in the remote highlands of central Viet Nam. 
Insofar as I can see, negotiations are and have 
always been the only rational alternative in this situation to 
an indefinite U. S. involvement on the Southeast Asian mai nland. 
Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues, including Senator 
Muskie, in a report at the cJnclusion of a visit to Southeast 
Asia. Our princ i pal observation, then, was that the American 
pos i tion in Viet Nam had the character of "pressing against a 
military situation which is, in effect, open- ended . " We added 
this comment:"How open i s dependent on the extent to which North 
Viet Nam and its supporters are willing and able to meet :.ncre~~~ 
increased force by increased force ." It is more apparent now 
than it was at the time that the war is open-ended . How open 
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may be uncertain--in my judgment it is still wide open--but in 
any event, to date, the NLF and the North Vietnamese have been 
both able and willing to meet increased force with increased 
force. 
At the beginning of 1966, the United States alreadJ 
had 180,000 men in Viet Nam. American forces directly involved 
in the war have since tri pled to somethi ng approaching 600,000--
with over 500,000 on the ground i n Viet Nam and the others serv-
i ng the war from elsewhere i n the region. Total American casual-
ties have gone well past 100,000. Last year's t oll of those 
/ 
k i lled i n act i on showed a seveti fold i ncrease i n two years, from 
1,964 i n 1965 to 9,353 i n 1967. 
This increase i n the American military effort has 
been met by i ncreases i n the North Vietnamese-NLF effort ; their 
casualties, t oo, have increased greatly. The war, in short, 
has risen over the past three years to ever higher i ntensities 
of destructiveness. The bas i c juxtaposition in Viet Nam, however 
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has not been altered as anticipated. In the spring of 1965, the 
all-consuming objective of the American effort was to prevent 
the collapse of a government with which we had allied ourselves . 
Almost three years later, countless thousands of lives later, 
and tens of billions of dollars later, that is still the 
objective. 
One can put whatever interpretation one chooses 
on the recent events in Viet Nam. To me, however, they suggest 
that the survival of the Saigon political structure, in its 
present form, may now be more uncertain. The pacification 
program appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior 
schemes for "winning the people" by providi ng them with security 
and a stake i n the structure. The cities of South Viet Nam 
which have heretofore been spared most of the ravages of the war, 
almost by tacit understanding, have now been drawn into the 
vortex of its terrible devastation. If there is an alternative 
to chaos in what has heretofore been the core of the government's 
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strength, it will lie in yet another costly task of reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation whjch can hardly be borne by the South 
Vietnamese government. 
What is now clear is that no part of South Viet 
Nam is secure for anyone. The hamlets, villages, and the cities 
of Viet Nam are seen to be honeycombed with a NLF infrastructure 
which has undoubtedly existed for many years, which is still 
intact and which may well be str~nger than ever. 
It is possible to point to one-sided casualty 
figures and to echo one-sjded words of reassurance. If we are 
interested in saving lives rather than saving face, however, I 
think we will find the realjsm to confront the implications of 
the present situation. The Saigon political structure is no 
stronger today than it was three years ago in the sense of being 
able on its own to govern, to defend or to rally the people of 
South Viet Nam. Indeed, its very survival now appears more 
dependent upon American military power than at any time in the 
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past. In short, once again there is not the beginnings of a 
beginning of a stable political situation in South Viet Nam. 
That such i s the case, in no way reflects on the 
courage or the competence of the military forces which have 
carried the burden of combat in Viet Nam for many months. In 
statistical terms, these forces have been immensely effective. 
They have won major engagement after engagement. The figures 
say that over 87,000 enemy troops were killed last year, that 
another 27,000 have crossed over to the government side and that 
countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of 
action. Naval and air power have pounded so much of North Viet 
Nam into rubble that there are left unscathed scarcely any 
military or i ndustri al targets. 
Nevertheless, for the k i nd of war which is be i ng 
fought in South Viet Nam, the forces in oppos i tion continue to 
obtai n adequate and, apparently, ever more sophisticated mili-
tary supplies over the i nfiltration routes from the North. The 
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NLF remains omnipresent, from the demilitarized zone at the 
17th parallel to the Mekong Delta and its regular forces and 
guerillas are steeled to accept great privation and to make 
enormous sacrifices. The Viet Cong remain entrenched and vir-
tually untouched in their traditional strongholds--the swamps, 
paddy-fields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta--from whence they 
are now seen to be able to dispatch forces to Saigon and other 
cities. North Viet Nam has committed to the war in the South 
considerably less than a quarter of the well-trained forces of 
General Giap. And beyond North Viet Nam lies the untapped 
manpower of China and the supply sources of both China and the 
Soviet Union. 
These are some of the realities whj_ch the com-
puters of 11 progress 11 in this war do not measure. These are 
some of the realities which urge us to recall the original 
purposes for which the nation was committed to South Viet Nam. 
They were, above all, limited purposes. We went into Viet Nam 
not to take over a war but on the assumption that we were 
summon~a to aid the people of South Viet Nam. 
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From the outset, it was not an American responsi-
bility and it is not now an American responsibility to win a 
victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any 
particular Vietnamese group. It was not then and it is not now 
an American function to insure that any political structure 
shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated 
Viet Nam. Even if we could, we should not seek to synthesize 
a government or system for South Viet Nam. That is not the 
responsibility of the American military command, the American 
economists and the American political scientists who are 
gathered in Saigon. That is a responsibility which can only 
be exercised by the Vietnamese people themselves. The sooner 
that the limits of our commitment are recognized by all 
directly concerned, therefore, the better for all concerned. 
We need to face the probability, bluntly, that 
the build-up of the Ameri can i nvolvement, in its very 
immensity, may well have already extended the role of this 
nation beyond those l imits. In so doing, it may not be aidi ng--
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as it was intended--to resolve the situation in accord with the 
wishes of the pe~ple of South Viet Nam. It is apparent, for 
example, that the more that U. S. forces have taken the major 
combat role, the slacker have been the efforts of the allied 
indigenous forces. It is apparent, too, that a massive U. S. 
technological presence in South Viet Nam has exerted a revolu-
tionary impact on the whole of the fabric of traditional 
Vietnamese society. 
In a physical sense, the crushing weight of 
modern warfare has fallen not only on the Viet Cong--the NLF--
and the North Vietnamese but on all Vietnamese. The terrible 
cost in lives and property throughout Viet Nam is borne by 
Vietnamese of all poljtical colors. 
Our immense effort, in short, has gone a long way 
in altering the character of what was once an inner struggle 
among Vietnamese. In the end, however, the future of Viet Nam 
must depend on the Vietnamese themselves. It is their country; 
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they live j_n it. They will be living in it long after we are 
gone from it. 
Our commitment is to support, not to submerge. 
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character, 
to convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation, 
detracts from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and 
to the people of the United States. To do so is to consolidate 
an American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of i nde-
finite duration and obscure purpose whose terminus is not 
visible--not in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia. Indeed, 
i t may well be an involvement whi ch is without exit except in 
World War III. 
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam 
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment 
as compelling us--in the name of victory or whatever--to see to 
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead, or 
fleeing to the North, and that North Viet Nam has been bombed 
back into the Stone Age. That course leads not to an ending but 
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to an endless successj.on of vjolent beginnings. An interminable 
involvement of American forces may meet the desires of some in 
Viet Nam or of some other nation, but that course does not 
accord with the substance of the interests of the United States. 
President Johnson has repeatedly stated that this 
nation's objective is 11 ••• only that the people of South VietNam 
be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. 11 He 
has stated that he is w5lling to move at any time in negotiation~ 
which might bring about that result. 
It should be made clear to all concerned--Ameri-
cans and Vietnamese--that that is the extent of this nation's 
commitment. The commitment is to all of the people of South 
Viet Nam. We have no obligation to continue to pour out the 
blood and resources of this nation until South Viet Nam is 
made safe for one faction or another . 
Indeed, in my judgment, there is little prospect 
of meeting our actual commitment to the people of Viet Nam in 
the visible future unless there is a prompt restoration of 
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peace. On that basis, every avenue--in the United Nations or 
elsewhere--should continue to be explored in an effort to reach 
an honorable conclusion. In so doing, this nation needs no 
sanction or approval from any group, leader, or whomever in 
Viet Nam or anywhere else. 
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settle-
ment without adding to the burdens of the American forces in 
the south, I have joined Senator Cooper and others in urging 
that the bombing of North Viet Nam be restricted to the infil-
tration routes at the 17th parallel. I am frank to say, however . 
that while it may well result in negotiations, I am not at all 
sure that a cessation of the bombing is the critical factor in 
bringing this war to an honorable conclusion. More important, 
in my judgment, is the framework in which the war in Viet Nam 
is seen and within which its conclusion is negotiated. It is 
doubtful that there is a basis for fruitful negotiations if 
the conflict is defined as a simple case of aggression on the 
part of the North against the South. The reality is far more 
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complex, far more subtle. That is true insofar as the relation-
ship between North and South Viet Nam is concerned. It is true 
insofar as the relationship of the various groups and elements 
within SouthViet Nam is concerned. The government in Saigon, 
as it is presently constituted continues to be run by a faction 
of military officers--indeed, most of whom are northerners--
and they are by no means the whole political coin. There are 
other gr0ups of southern Vietnamese who must be taken more into 
consideration if there is to be an end to the bloodshed in the 
foreseeable future. These groups include not only those within 
the Nat i onal Liberation Front but elements wh ch are now without 
significant voice in either camp. 
A negotiated solution, if there i s to be one, may 
well involve preliminary discussions among the political, reli-
gous, and sectarian groups, as well as the ruling military group, 
which are to be found under the Saigon structure. If there can 
be some common agreement among them to seek a settlement of the 
war, it is at least conceivable that there could then be 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 9, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 17 -
discussions with the National Liberation Front. Needless to 
say, such discussions can hardly take place if the Saigon govern-
ment regards even words of compromise as treasonable. 
If the door could be opened to peace-talks among 
the South Vietnamese themselves, one would hope that it would 
make easier the opening of doors to negotiat i_ons between this 
nation and North Viet Nam and among all the nations directly or 
indirectly concerned in the conflict. A basis might then be 
laid for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 in deter-
mining the future relationship of the two parts of Viet Nam and 
for guaranteeing the neutralization of Viet Nam and all of Indo-
China. May I add it does not much matter whether such discus-
sions are held under United Nations auspices or in Geneva, or 
in some other appropriate forum. What is necessary is that 
they encompass all who are closely involved, including China, 
if there is to be a durable peace in V~ Nam and Indo-China. 
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I do not know whether there are any greater 
prospects for progress towards peace i n this approach than 
in the countless others wh i ch have been suggested. I believe, 
however, that unless there is the beginni ng of a negotiated 
peace, the f i res of war in Viet Nam will blaze ever more 
fiercely. They will spread further and further, leaving 
ever wider arcs of a p i teous wreckage. And if the fires 
burn out of control to World War III, what nation will 
claim the vi ctory? Indeed, what nation wi l l be left to 
claim it? 
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really an officer; you know he's an enllst,cd 
man at heart." 
His squadron has the task or s>:'pporllng 
the Navy's Atlantic Fleet by moving perBOn-
nel and supplies to where they're nccdc'<l. 
A letter from Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-
N.C .. offered congratulations on "another suc-
cessful milestone In the history of the Rene-
gar fnml ." 
Jack egnr, left after the ceremony to 
get b to Puerto Rico. The others will leave 
T ny, with the elder Renegar driving to 
Jersey with son Ray before flying back 
North Carolina. 
SENATOR MANSFIELD HONORED AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE 
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on last 
Sunday, February 11, 1968, the people of 
Maine and the University of Maine were 
privileged and proud to welcome the dis-
tinguished majority leader and Mrs. 
Mansfield as guests for a memorable day. 
The occasion was the university's 
founders day convocation. The setting-
a crisp Maine day with blue skies and 
newly fallen snow-must have been 
somewhat reminiscent of Montana. 
Senator MANSFIELD was warmly re-
ceived by a capacity audience of 3,000 
students, faculty, and citizens in the uni-
versity's fteldhouse. He chose to discuss 
our policies in Korea and Vietnam. 
As we have come to expect of him, his 
message was though tful, constructive, 
and responsible. It was received by a 
hushed and attentive audience which re-
sponded with a standing ovation. 
Senator MANSFIELD's speech was a ma-
jor contribution to the continuing debate 
over our policies in Korea and Vietnam. 
It is worthy of widespread and thought-
ful consideration. For that reason, Mr. 
President, I ask unanimous consent that 
it be printed at this point in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
VIETNAM 
(Speech o! Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Demo-
crat, or Montana, at the University or 
Maine convocation, Orono, Maine, February 
11, 1968) 
My remarks, today, deal with Viet Na.m_ 
Before proceeding to them, however, I wish 
to refer to the USS Pueblo Incident. When 
added to the Vietnamese conftlct, It ls illus-
trative or the hydra-headed character or 
m!l!tary Involvement on the mainland or 
Asia. War spreads readily on that continent; 
the difficulty lies In curbing It. I would 
emphasize, therefore. that while the urgency 
1n Viet Nam Is to brln~ one bloody conflict 
to a close, the Imperative In K orea Is to 
prevent the opening o! another. 
In the latter connection, lt will help to 
bear In mind the essentials or the Pueblo 
affair. A U.S. vessel-that It was an electronic 
ltstener of some sort is not disputed-was in 
a p osition off the North Korean coast. What 
vital national need prompted the dispatch or 
this particular mission or why the vessel 
went undefended are not as yet, ful!y known. 
All reports available to me In both the 
White House and the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Indicate that the Pueblo was In Inter-
national waters at the tlrne It was taken. 
As or the moment, the Pueblo Is now at 
anchor ln Wonsa.n harbor and the 82 surviv-
ing crewmen who were aboard--one other 
has died-are Interned \n North Korea. That 
Ineluctable !act Is In no way altered by a 
sense of outrage or lnd!gna tlon. 
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying 
out a dangerous assignment. The "why" and 
the "how" or the mission are moot at thlll 
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point. What mnttcra now IH th~ ohliKntton to 
thooe men. In our ru•u:lloi\H to the Pueblo 
alTair, lives must not l)eeonw the pawnR or 
either pride or pctulaucfl Every e!Tort to 
bring abOut their relcnse must be made. 
We will alsu do well to b~nr In mind that 
the one war In which we nrc engaged on the 
Asian mainland bas become n source or Im-
mense grief. Any move which lends Into a 
second Vietnamese-type conflict In Korea 
w111 compound the grief but hardly serve the 
Interests or tbls nation. 
In sum, what most matters at tbls point. 
It seems to me, Is: (1) return or the 80-0dd 
American crewmen al!ve----I repeat, allve----
and; (2) prevention or a 'Second war In Korea 
on the pattern or VIet Nam which ce>uld the 
more readily become World War Ill. 
Tbe firm restraint which President John-
son bas exercised from the outset or the 
Pueblo affair has set a wise course for this 
nation. The question has been raised at the 
United Nations Security Council by Ambas-
sador Arthur Goldberg. It has been pursued 
at the Panmunjom truce site In discussions 
between our represen tat! ves and those or 
North Korea. Other channels are also being 
tapped which might lead to the release of 
the crewmen. In short, the President's pol-
Icy at this time Is to seek a solution by 
diplomacy. It Is the cour'SC of prudence and 
reason In what Is, at best, a delicate and 
dangerous situation. It deserves every sup-
port of the nation. 
There Is no certainty that the present ef-
forts will bear !rult. Other possibilities, bow-
ever, may also be avallable. I would point 
out, !or example, that, I! necessary, the mat-
ter should be pressed further at the United 
Nations which bas had a definite responsibil-
Ity In Koren for almost two decades It It 
comes to that. It may be feasible to seek 
Impartial arbitration or mediation or a 
presentation or the entire matter to the 
World Court. May I say that precedent !or 
the latter procedure Is to be round In a 
s!mllar dispute two dectldcs ago over the loss 
o! two Brltlsb destroyers of! the Albnnlnn 
Coast. 
Whatever the specific recourse, In my 
judgment, the efforts to find a peaceful so-
lution In the Pueblo atl'alr are attuned to 
this nation's Interest. What matters In my 
judgment Is saving lives, not saving race. 
What matters Is the substance not the shad-
ow o! this nation's Interests. 
That Is true In Korea; and It Is no less true 
In VIet Nam. The nation's Interests In VIet 
Nam, In my judgment, lie In bringing the 
war to an honorable conclu•lon at the eRrllest 
possible moment. The pursuit o! a negoti-
ated solution was right !or this nation before 
the rocent coordinated otren.·,lves In the SOuth 
VIetnamese cities. It Is right today, whlle 
that offensive continues In oertnln areas and 
when a second offensive mny be on the verge 
o! opening, 1! not In Khe S·mh, somewhere 
else In the remote highlands o! central VIet 
Nam. 
Insofar as I can see, negotiations nrc and 
have always been the only rtltlonnl alterna-
tive In this situation to an Indefinite U .S. 
Involvement on the Southeast Asian main-
land. Two years ago I joined four Senate col-
leagues. Including Senator Edmund Muskle, 
my close and trusted friend, the distin-
guished denn o! the Senate Republicans, Sen-
ator George Aiken o! Vermont and the 
equally cllstlngulshed Senators !rom Delaware 
and Hawall, J. Caleb Boggs and Daniel 
Inouye, In a report at conclusion o! a visit to 
Southeast Asia. Our principal observation. 
then. was that the American position In VIet 
Nam bad the character or "pressing against a 
military situation which Is, In effect, open-
ended." We added this comment: "How 
open is dependent on the extent to 
which North VIetNam and Its supporters are 
w1111ng and able to meet Increased force by 
Increased force." It 1s more apparent now 
than It was at the time that the war Is open-
ended. How open may be uncertain-In my 
Judgment It Is still wlc:le open-but 1n any 
event, trJ date. the NLF and the North Vlet-
lll\mese hnve been both ab le and willing to 
H>cet lncro.l~Cd for"c wllll Increased force. 
At the beginning or triG(), the United States 
already had 180.00 men In Viet Nnm Ameri-
can forces directly tnvulvLd In the war have 
since tripled to something !lpproachlng 600.-
000-wlth over 000.000 on the ground In VIet 
Na.m. 40,000 In Thnllnnd 40.000 In the 7th 
Fleet In the South China Sen nnd slmllar 
back-up forces In Japan, Okinawa, Ounm 
and elsewhere. Total American casualties 
have gone well past 100.000. Last year's toll of 
those k111ed In Rctlon showed a great Increase 
In two years, from 1,964 In 1965 to 9,353 In 
1967. 
This Increase In the American m111tary ef-
fort hns been met by Increases In the North 
Vletnamese-NLF etl'ort; their cnsunltles, too. 
have Increased greatly. The war, In 5hort, has 
risen over the past thre<) yen" to ever higher 
Intensities or destructlvrne~s. The baste jux-
taposition In VIetnam. however hns not been 
altered as antlcJpnted. In the spring o! 1065, 
the all-consuming objective or the American 
effort was to prevent the co11np•e or a govern-
ment with which we hnd allied ourselves. Al-
most three years later. <'Ountless thousands 
o! lives Inter, and tens or b1111ons or dollars 
later, that Is st111 the objective. 
One can put whatever Interpretation one 
chooses on the recent events In VIet Nam. 
To me. however, they suggest that the sur-
vlvn.l. or the Saigon polltlcnl s: n>cture, In Its 
present !orm. may now be more uncertain. 
The pacltlcnflon program appears to have 
gone the route o! at least a dO'Zen prior 
schemes for "winning the people" by provid-
Ing them with security and a stake 1n the 
stn>cture. The cities or South VIet Nam 
which have heretofore been spared most or 
the ravages of the war, nlmost by ta.clt un-
derst:mdlng, have now been drawn Into the 
vortex o! Its terrible devastation. I! there Is 
an alternative to chaos m what has hereto-
fore been the core o! the government's 
strength. It w111 He In yet another costly task 
of reconstruction and rehnb111tat1on which 
can hardly be borne by the South VIet-
namese government. 
Whtlt Is now clear Is that no part or South 
VIet Nn.m Is secure !or anyone. Tbe hamlets, 
v111ages. and the cl ties or VIet Nam are seen 
to be honeycombed with a NLF Infrastruc-
ture which has undoubtedly exlst.ed for mnny 
yenrs, which Is still Intact nnd which may 
well be stronger th:m ever. 
It Is possible to point to one-sided cnsunlty 
figures and to echo one-sided words of re-
assurance. I! we are Interested In snvlng Hves 
rather thnn saving !nee. however, I think we 
w111 find the realism to confront the lmpllcn-
tlons or the present sltuo.tlon. The Saigon 
po11 tical structure Is no stronger tOday than 
It was three years ago In the sense o! b«'lng 
able on Its own to govern. to defend or to 
rally the people of South VIet Nnm. Indeed, 
Its very survival now appears more depend-
ent upon American m111tary power than at 
any time In the past. In short, once agnln 
there Is not the beginnings o! a beginning o! 
a stable polltlcal sltuallon in South Viet 
Nam. 
Thnt such Is the case. In no way refiects 
on the courage or the competence or the 
mllltary forces which hnve carried the bur-
den or combat In VIetNam !or many months. 
In statistical terms, these forces have been 
Immensely effective. They hnve won major 
engagement after engngt'ment. The figures 
say that over 87,000 enemy troops were k111ed 
last year, that another 27.000 have crossed 
over to the government side and that count-
less thousands were captured or were other-
wise put out of action. Navnl and ai r power 
have pounded so much o! North VIet Nam 
Into rubble that there are left unscathed 
scarcely nny m111tary or Industrial targets. 
Nevertheless, !or the kind or wnr which Is 
being fought In South VIet Na.m, the forces 
1n opposltlon continue to obtain adequate 
and, apparently, ever more sophisticated mil-
Itary supplles over the lnfi.Jtratlon routes 
!rom the North. Tbe NLF remains omnipres-
ent. from the demUltnrl~ed zone at the 17th 
parallel to the Mekong Delta and Its regular 
forces and guerrillas are steeled to accept 
great privation and to make enormous sacri-
fices. The VIet Cong remain entrenched and 
virtually untouched In their tradl tiona! 
strongholds--the swamps, paddy-fields and 
hamlets or the Mekong Delta-from whence 
they are now seen to be able to dlspntch 
forces to Snlgon and other cities. North VIet 
Nam has committed to the war In the South 
considerably less than a quarter or the well-
trained rorces o! General Glap. And beyond 
North VIet Nam lles the untapped manpower 
o! China and the supply HOUrces o! both 
Chinn and the Soviet Union. 
These a re some of the rea11 ties which the 
computers or "progress" In this war do not 
measure. These nre some o! the realltles 
which urge us to recall the original purposes 
for which the nation was committed to South 
VIet Nam. They were, above all , llmlted pur-
poses. We went Into VIet Nam not to take 
over a war but on the assumption that we 
were summoned to aid the people o! South 
VIet Nnm. 
From the outset, It was not an American 
responslblllty and It Is not now an Ameri-
can respons1b111ty to win a victory for any 
particular VIetnamese group, or to defeat any 
particular VIetnamese group. It was not then 
nnd It Is not now an Amerlcnn function to 
Insure that any pol1tlcal structure shall be 
enshrined over the smoldering ruins o! a 
devastated VIet Nam. Even 1! we could, we 
should not seek to synthesize a government 
or system !or South VIet Nam. That Is not 
the responslblllty of the American mllltary 
command, the American economists and the 
Amerlcnn po11t1cal scientists who are 
gathered In Saigon or elsewhere. That Is a 
respons1b111ty which can only be exercised 
by the VIetnamese people themselves. Tbe 
sooner that the 11m1ts or our commitment 
nre recognl?.ed by all directly concerned, 
therefore, the better ror all concerned. 
We need to face the probablllty, bluntly, 
that the bulld-up or the American Involve-
ment, In Its very Immensity. may well have 
already extended the role or this nation be-
yond those llmlts. In so doing, It may not 
be nldlng-as It was Intended-to resolve the 
situation In accord with the wtsbes of the 
people o! SOuth VIet Nn.m. It Is apparent. 
for example, that the more that U.S. forces 
have taken the major combat role, the 
slncker have been the efforts or the al11ed 
Indigenous forces. It Is apparent, too, that 
n massive U.S. technological presence In 
SOuth VIet Nam has exerted a revolutionary 
Impact on the whole or the !nbrlc o! trn-
dltlonal VIetnamese society. 
In a physical sense. the crushing weight nf 
modern warfare has fallen not only on the 
Vlt't Cong-the NLF-and the North VIet-
namese but on all VIetnamese. The tehlble 
cost In 11ves nnd property throughout VIet 
Nam 1s borne by VIetnamese o! nil polltlca l 
colors. 
Our Immense effort, In short. has gone a 
long way In altering the character or what 
was once an Inner struggle among VIet-
namese. In the end, however, the future or 
VIet Nam must depend on the VIetnamese 
themselves. It Is their country; they llve 
In lt. They w111 be Jiving In It long after we 
are gone from 1 t. 
Our commitment Is to support, not to sub-
merge. To strip the VIetnamese struggle o! 
Its VIetnamese character. to convert It Into 
n war to be won or lost by this nation, de-
tracts from Its relevance both to the people 
or VIetNam and to the people of the United 
States. To do so Is to consolldnte an Ameri-
can Involvement on the SOutheast Asian 
mainland o! Indefinite duration ahd obscure 
purpose whose terminus Is not visible---not In 
VIet Nam, not In Lnos, or In Cambodia. In-
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deed, It may well be an Involvement which Is 
without exit except In World War III. 
This nation Is deeply committed In South 
VIet Nam but let us not make the mistake 
or Interpret ing that commitment as com-
pelling us--In the name of victory or what-
ever-to see to It that every last member of 
the NLF Is either dulled. dead, or fleeing to 
t he North, and t hat North VIetNam has been 
bombed back Into the Stone Age. That course 
leads not to an ending but to an endless suc-
cession of violent beginnings. An Inter-
minable Involvement of American forces may 
meet the desires of some In VIet Nam or of 
some other nation, but that course does not 
accord with the substance of the Interests of 
the United States. 
President Johnson has repeatedly stated 
that this nation's objective Is " ... only that 
the people of south Viet Nam be allowed to 
gulde their own country In their own way." 
He has stated that he Is willing to move at 
any time In negotiations which might bring 
about that result. 
It should be made clear to all concerned-
Amertcans and VIetnamese--that that Is the 
extent of this nation's commitment. The 
commitment Is to all of the people of South 
VIet Nam. We have no obligation to continue 
to pour out the blood and resources of this 
nation until South VIet Nam Is made safe 
for one faction or another. 
Indeed, In my judgment, there Is little 
prospect of meeting our actual commitment 
to the people or VIet Nnm In the visible 
future unless there Is a prompt restoration 
of peace. On that basis, every avenue-
In the United Nations or elsewher~hould 
continue to be explored In an effort to reach 
an honorable conclusion. In so doing, this 
nation needs no sanction or approval from 
any group, leader, or whomever In VIet Nam 
or anywhere else. 
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful 
settlement without adding to the burdens 
of the American forces In the south, I have 
joined Senator John Sherman Cooper, a 
distinguished colle3€ue with whom I served 
In the U.N., & a former Ambassador to India 
and others In urging that the bombing of 
North VIet Nam be restricted to the Infil-
tration routes at the 17th parallel. I am 
frank to say, however that while It may well 
result In negotiations, I am not at all sure 
that a cessation of the bombing Is the 
c~ltlcal factor In bringing this war to an 
honorable conclusion. More Important, In 
my ]\ldgment, Is the framework In which 
the war In VIet Nam Is seen and within 
which Its conclusion Is negotiated. It Is 
doubtful that there Is a basis for fruitful 
negotiations 11 the conflict Is defined as a 
simple case of aggression on the part of the 
North against the South. The reality Is tar 
more complex, far more subtle. That Is true 
Insofar as the relationship between North 
and South VIet Nam Is concerned. It Is true 
Insofar as the relationship of the various 
groups and elements within South VIetNam 
Is concerned. The government In Saigon, 
as It Is presently constituted continues to 
be run by a faction of military officers-
Indeed, most or whom are northerners--and 
they are by no means the whole political 
coin. There are other groups of southern 
VIetnamese, the Cao Dal, Hoa Hoa, Budd-
hists, Dal VIet, Catholics, Montagnards, & 
others who must be taken more Into con-
sideration If there Is to be an end to the 
blOOdshed In the foreseeable future. These 
groups Include not only those within the 
National L:beratlon Front but elements 
which are now without significant voice In 
either camp. 
A negotiated solution, If there Is to be one, 
may well Involve preliminary discussions 
among the political, religious, and sectarian 
groups, as well as the ruling mill tary group, 
which are to be round under the Saigon 
structure. It there can be some common 
agreement among them to seek a settlement 
or the war, It Is at lea&t conceivable thnt 
there could then be discussions with the 
National Liberation Front. Needless to say, 
such discussions can hardly take place If the 
Saigon government regards even words of 
compromlse as treasonable. 
If the door could be opened t o peace-talks 
among the South VIetnamese themselves. one 
would hope that It would make easier the 
opening of doors to negotiations between this 
nation and North Viet Nam and among all 
the nations directly or Indirectly concerned 
In the conflict. A basis might then be laid 
for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 
1962 In determining the future relationship 
of the two parts of VIet N<tm and for guaran-
teeing the neutrallzntlon of VietNam and all 
of Indo-China. May I add it does not much 
matter whether such discussions are held 
under Unl ted Na tlons auspices or In Geneva, 
or In some other appropriate forum. What Is 
necessary Is that they encompass all who are 
closely Involved, Including China, If there Is 
to be a durable pence In VIet Nam and Indo-
China. 
I do not know whether there are any great-
er prospects for progress towards peace In 
this approach than In the countless others 
which have been suggested. I believe, how-
ever, that unless there Is the beginning of a 
negotiated peace, the fires of war In VIetNam 
wlll blaze ever more fiercely. They w111 spread 
further and further, leaving ever wider arcs 
of a piteous wreckage. And if the fires burn 
out or control to World War ill, what nation 
will claim the victory? Indeed , what nation 
will be lett to claim It? 
Mr. MUSKIE. It was highly appropri-
ate, Mr. President, that following his 
speech, the degree of doctor of laws 
should be conferred upon Senator MANS-
FIELD by the president of the university, 
Dr. Edwin Young. As evidence of the 
great respect in which the majority lead-
er is held by the people of Maine, and 
the pride we take in him as an honorary 
alumnus of the university, I ask unani-
mous consent that the citation read by 
Dr. Young be printed in the RECORD at 
this point. 
There being no objection, the citation 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
CITATION READ TO SENATOR MANSFIELD. UNI-
VERSITY OF MAINE CONVOCATION, FEBRU• 
ARY 11, 1968, ORONO, MAINE 
Born In New York City and raised In Great 
Falls, Montana, he became a grammar school 
dropout at the age of 14, when he enlisted 
In the United States Navy to serve In World 
War I. At the close of the war, no doubt 
feeling that a variety of experience would be 
useful later on, he re-enellsted and served a 
one year hitch, but this time In the United 
States Anny. This prepared him for the ulti-
mate In military activity, two years "on the 
land and on the sea" with the United States 
Marine Corps. 
Passing up a career In the Air Force, he re-
turned In 1922 to Montana to work In the 
mines. Soon his desire for more knowledge 
and wider horizons led him to take a quali-
fications examination to enter college. After 
a start In the Montana School of Mines, he 
went on to the B .A. and M .A. Degrees at 
Montana State University. Meanwhile, his 
Interest In peoples beyond our borders had 
become deep and strong. After further studies 
at UCLA he was for 10 years a professor 
of Latin American and Far Eastern History at 
Montana State and Is still professor of His-
tory on a pennanent tenure at the University 
of Montana. 
While still a college teacher he was elected 
to Congress In 1942 and served 5 terms In the 
House of Representatives. He Is now In his 
third term In the Senate. His unusual quail-
ties brought him the post of Assistant Ma-
jority Leader even In his first term. In 1961 
he became Majority Leader of the Senate. a 
position he still holds. He Is an Influential 
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Few men In politics are so well 
qualified for this work. In the past 16 years, 
under 4 Presidents, he has served his country 
with exceptional distinction, especially In 
foreign affairs as related to Europe and his 
long-term Interests-Latin America and 
Southeast Asia. 
In recognition or your distinctly American 
rise from modest beginnings, of your exercise 
or statesmanlike qualities over a quarter cen-
tury or public service, and or your wide repu-
tation for lntegrtty, forthrightness, and 
steadiness In a trying profession In trying 
times, the Trustees of the University of 
Maine are pleased and proud to confer upon 
you the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws; 
and by virtue or authority granted to me by 
the Board of Trustees, I declare that to 
Michael Joseph Mansfield belong all the 
rights and honors of the degree which has 
been granted and that his name shall for-
ev.er be borne on the rolls of the University 
of Maine. 
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President. I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed -in 
the RECORD an editorial published in the 
Bangor Daily News of February 14, 1968. 
There being no objection, the editorial 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
LET US HAVE MORE FaONT-RANK VISITORS 
We congratulate the University of Maine, 
assisted by Senator Edmund S. Muskle, for 
bringing to the Orono campus last Sunday 
such a distinguished visitor as Senator Mike 
Mansfield of Montana, Democratic chieftain 
In the Senate. 
As honor guest at the Founders Day Con-
vocation, Mansfield gave an Interesting talk 
and news Interview. His words provided copy 
for the news media of the nation, bearing 
the dateline of Orono, Me. He talked very 
frankly about such controversial matters as 
the VIetnam war and the proposed travel tax. 
It was a stimulating day. 
We hope It w111 spur efforts to bring other 
prominent lenders Into the state from time to 
time. Maine Is small In terms of population 
and not very Influential In national affairs. 
But Its citizens and educational Institutions 
are first class, and rate a fair share of atten-
tion by front-ranking national leaders. This 
was recognized, by the way, by no less a per-
son than the late President John F. Ken-
nedy, whose visit to Orono In 1963 was a 
most memorable event. 
Let's think big when seeking distinguished 
guests for college commencement exercises 
and other Important occasions relating to af-
fairs within the state. 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN R HTS 
URGES U.S. RATIFICAT N OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS CO TIONS 
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